Jinsoul Seo

Jinsoul Seo

PhD Candidate in Quantitative Marketing

Simon Business School
University of Rochester

On the 2027–2028 academic job market

About

I am a PhD candidate in Quantitative Marketing at the Simon Business School, University of Rochester. I work at the intersection of empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing.

My research has two strands. The first is how firms compete over what they bring to market: when to launch a new product, how to price what is already on sale, and whether to keep serving a market at all. The second is what consumers know when they choose, and how firms, platforms, and policy shape the information available to them. I study both strands with structural models of firm and consumer behavior, estimated alongside causal evidence from large-scale data.

Research interests Empirical Industrial Organization · Economics of Artificial Intelligence · Digital Platforms · Marketing and Public Policy

Research

Working Paper

Do Review Solicitations Elicit Reviews Where They Matter for Sales and Product Returns?

with Hana Choi and Minkyung Kim · Revise & resubmit, Marketing Science

Abstract

Firms routinely solicit online reviews, yet it remains unclear whether solicitations generate reviews where future buyers value them most—and thereby increase sales and reduce product returns—because solicitations target reviewers while benefits accrue to buyers. Using individual-level panel data on purchases, solicitations, reviews, and returns from a large apparel e-commerce retailer and leveraging natural variation in solicitation exposure, we estimate a reviewer model measuring how solicitations affect review generation across informational states and a demand model measuring how additional reviews affect subsequent orders and returns. We find that an additional review improves downstream buyer outcomes, especially reducing return rates by up to 11.9% when prior review information is scarce. However, for reviewers, solicitations increase review incidence on average but are least effective in these low-information states. These patterns reveal a systematic reviewer–buyer misalignment: solicitations fail to elicit reviews where they matter most. We attribute this to a first-and-early review barrier driven by psychological frictions. A counterfactual exercise shows that increasing the solicitation effect in the zero-review state from its current near-zero level to 1.7%, the largest heterogeneous effect estimated across review-information states, raises net revenue by $0.72 per solicitation message, underscoring the value of overcoming early review barriers.

Work in Progress

Racing to Release: The Timing of AI Model Launches under Competition

Job Market Paper

Do Survivors Respond? Rival Conduct and Demand Succession When a Retail Chain Exits

Education

Contact

jseo13@simon.rochester.edu
Simon Business School, University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14620